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Abstract - Historically, in the majority of judicial systems, the protection of trademarks 
with reputation differs from the protection of normal trademarks. It is widely recognised 
that reputed trademarks have an “added value” deserving wider protection. The 
contribution analyses the evolution of the protection of trademarks with reputation in the 
European Union legislation and the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU). The First Directive strengthened the protection of trademarks with 
reputation both in the field of registration and in the field of infringement. Article 5(2) of 
the TMD leaves to Member States the possibility to protect well-known trademarks 
against dilution. Third parties can be prevented by the proprietor of the trademark with 
reputation from using signs identical or similar to this trademark. The use must take place 
in the course of trade, the products or services with which it is related should be similar to 
those for which the trademark is registered and it must take unfair advantage of the 
distinctiveness of the trademark or be detrimental to it. Considering the internet features, 
its availability worldwide and the growing number of users, it is evident that is essential 
for a trademark to expand its reputation and monitor if it is used by third parties that can 
damage its reputation or take advance of it. The protection of reputed trademarks on the 
internet is very discussed and problematic. Many actions have been brought for trademark 
infringement by the use of similar or identical signs ad keywords in search engines. The 
ECJ tried to order and clarify the application of EU legislation to these particular cases 
(Vuitton v Google, L'Oreal v Ebay and Interflora v Marks and Spencer). 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Trademarks are crucial in companies’ marketing strategies: their essential 
function, the function of origin, allows undertakings to distinguish and 
individualize their products or services from that of their competitors. They 
can promote their name and strengthen their image and reputation in 
consumers’ eyes. 
The aim of trademark protection is plural: the trademark owner’s 
interest for the identification, the interest of the consumer of having a real 
freedom of choice and a public interest of establishing and maintaining 
                                                
* Ph.D. candidate at ‘Scuola Dottorale Internazionale di Diritto ed Economia “Tullio 
Ascarelli”’ –Diritto privato per l’Europa- Roma Tre University. 
 UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
 
 
 
 
65 
 
 
competition based on quality.1 The balancing of these different interests 
draws the limits of trademark protection: an absolute protection would lead 
to the creation of a monopoly for the trademark’s owner that would be 
incompatible with the above-mentioned interests and thus create a prejudice 
for competitors.2 
Traditionally, the protection of trademarks has been centred on the 
essential function of origin. However, the evolution of the market, of the 
meaning of trademarks, as well as the identification of different functions, 
has highlighted the need for a different kind of protection against new kinds 
of aggressions, especially for reputed trademarks.3  
Products and services are always more similar and it is very difficult 
to improve customer retention. Only strong trademarks distinguish 
themselves from their competitors.4 In the Internet era, taking into account 
the volume of electronic commerce, there is a need for specific protection of 
the use of well-known trademarks on websites and internet service 
providers.  
The aim of this paper is to discuss, through an analysis of the case law 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter: CJEU) and of the 
General Court, the protection provided by European Union law (hereinafter: 
EU law) of trademarks with reputation, namely the use of keywords identical 
or similar to a registered well-known trademark in search engines. 
 
B. REPUTED TRADEMARKS AND EU LAW 
                                                
1 Tullio Ascarelli, ‘Teoria della concorrenza e interesse del consumatore’ (1954) Riv trim 
dir proc civ, 869. 
2 Adriano Vanzetti, ‘Equilibrio di interessi e diritto al marchio’ (1960) I Rivista di diritto 
commerciale 261. 
3 Trevor Cook, EU Intellectual property Law (OUP 2010) 254. The use of the words 
‘trademark with reputation’, ‘reputed trademark’ and ‘well-known trademark’ will be 
interchangeable as it is in the jurisprudence of the CJEU, even if in some national system 
these terms have slightly different meanings.  
4 Celestino Ciocca, Total Brand Experience (Franco Angeli 2004). The strength of a 
trademark is the power of his reputation to attract customers and convey to the consumer 
a series of elements that creates in his mind an association to positive values and feelings. 
Today what the consumer expects when he is choosing to buy a branded product or 
service is not anymore the mere correspondence with a quality standard but a total 
experience of the feelings that he associates with the trademarks’ ‘aura’. 
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Trademark law in Europe has been the subject of several legislative 
initiatives. Directive 89/104/EEC 5  (the first TMD) and Directive 
2008/95/EC6 (hereinafter: TMD), that replaced the first without substantial 
modifications, have harmonised the substantive laws of Member States. 
Regulation (EC) No 40/957 (first CTMR) created the Community trademark 
and the Regulation (EC) No 207/20098 (hereinafter: CTMR) pursued the 
establishment of a unitary system of protection.  
The CJEU has received numerous referrals pertaining to the 
interpretation of the directives and regulations, most of them regarding the 
notion of “use in the course of trade” and the notion of “function of the 
trademark”9.  
For the purpose of this discussion, it is important to note that the 
CJEU, after initially only focussing its attention on the function of origin as 
the essential function, began to consider other functions of trademarks, 
especially in relation to trademarks with reputation. The recent jurisprudence 
of the Court is full of references to “other functions”: the importance of 
advertising, goodwill, communication and investment functions taken into 
serious account when assessing the damage to a trademark’s reputation. The 
advertising function represents the investments made by the trademark 
owner to develop the image of his mark. This function is linked to the 
communication function that is the “evocative power of the trademark to 
convey characteristics, images, and feelings to the public”10. The goodwill 
function is the “image” of the trademark represented by these characteristics, 
images and feelings. 11 The CJEU has explicitly recognised all the 
                                                
5 Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of Member States 
relating to trademarks, [1989] OJ L40/1. 
6 Directive 2008/95/EC of 22 October 2008 to approximate the laws of Member States 
relating to trademarks (codified version) [2008] OJ L299/25. 
7 Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trademark 
[1994] OJ L 11/1. 
8 Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community 
trademark (codified version) [2009] OJ L78/1. 
9 See for a general description of the attitude of the CJEU in the interpretation of the 
Directive 89/104/EEC, WR Cornish and David Llewelyn, Intellectual Property: 
Patents,Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights (6th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2007). 
10 Ciocca (n 4). 
11 T.Cohen Jehoram, CJJC.Van Nispen, JLRA Huydecoper, European Trademark Law 
(KLI 2010) This image can be related to luxury, exclusivity, lifestyle and even the attitude 
of the consumers to the trademark, for instance the fact that products or services bearing a 
particular trademark are popular in a highly regarded group of the population. 
 UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
 
 
 
 
67 
 
 
abovementioned different functions in the L’Oreal v Bellure12 case, a case 
considered to be a turning point in the development of the case law on the 
protection of trademarks. 
  
1. The Protection of Trademarks with Reputation  
Trademarks with reputation benefit first from the same protection granted to 
trademarks in general against the risk of confusion. In addition, they are 
protected against dilution, meaning the loss of the capacity to have a singular 
association in the public mind with a particular product. 
According to Article 5(1) of the TMD, the owner of a registered 
trademark should have an exclusive right to use the trademark in the course 
of trade, i.e. he should be able to prevent third parties from using it in the 
course of trade:  
“(a) any sign which is identical with the trademark in relation to goods 
or services which are identical with those for which the trademark is 
registered” and  
“(b) any sign where, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the 
trademark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services 
covered by the trademark and the sign, there exists a likelihood of 
confusion on the part of the public; the likelihood of confusion 
includes the likelihood of association between the sign and the 
trademark.” 
If for trademarks in general, enabling the owner of a trademark to 
prevent the use of a sign similar or identical to the registered trademark for 
similar or identical products or services by third parties seems sufficient to 
ensure the identification of the source of the products and the services for 
which the trademark is registered13, the same is not true to grant an adequate 
protection to well-known trademarks. 
Article 5(2) of the TMD, implemented by all Member States of the 
EU14, provides the possibility to protect well-known trademarks against 
dilution. The proprietor of a trademark that has a distinctive character shall 
be entitled to prevent third parties from using in the course of trade “any sign 
which is identical with, or similar to, the trade mark in relation to goods or 
                                                
12 Case C-487/07, L’Oreal and others v Bellure and others [2009] ECR I- 05185. 
13 Case C-102/77, Hoffman Roche v Centrafarm, [1978] ECR I-01139. 
14 Cook (n 3). 
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services which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is 
registered” if the use of that sign “without due cause takes unfair advantage 
of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade 
mark”. 
 
(a) Reputation  
According to settled case law of the CJEU15, a trademark should have a 
certain “degree of knowledge” in order to benefit from the wider protection 
of Article 5(2). The trademark must be “known by a significant part of the 
public concerned by the goods or services” for which the trademark is 
registered16. The Court gives a flexible definition of “significant” taking into 
account the sector of the activity of the trademark, without referring to a 
particular percentage17. It is not necessary that the territorial extension of the 
reputation involves a whole Member State, it is sufficient for the trademark 
to have a reputation in “a substantial part”18 of a Member State. The General 
Court reached an interesting conclusion in recognising the reputation of a 
sign due to its “importance to the world’s economy in general, and the 
media” 19. The trademark had continued and there was widespread visibility 
on many reviews and newspapers, it was “very commonly mentioned on 
radio and television in the European Union, both in financial broadcasts and 
in general news programme”20 even if there was no proof of the use of the 
trademark to promote services for whom it was registered. 
The CJEU is quite restrictive about the burden of proof required for a 
trademark to demonstrate its reputation. It is for the parties to allege all the 
relevant facts for the evaluation21. The General Court seems less restrictive: 
the reputation does not need to be proved if there is a commonly held public 
view that the trademark is well known, moreover if one of the parties does 
not contest it 22 . The Court repeated on several occasions that the 
                                                
15Case  C-375/97 General Motors Corp v Yplon SA [1999] E.C.R. I-5421, para 28. 
16 CaseT-8/03, El Corte Ingles v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market [2004] 
ECR II-04297, para 67. 
17 General Motors (n 15), paras 24-25. 
18 ibid para 28. 
19 Case T-47/06, Antartica Srl v Office of Harmonization in the Internal Market [2007] 
ECR II-00042 at paragraph 31. 
20 ibid. 
21 General Motors (n 15) para 27. 
22Case T-67/04 Spa Monopole v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market [2005] 
E.C.R. II-01825, paras 27-28. 
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appreciation of the reputation should be global and should be based on the 
“overall impression” created by the visual, aural or conceptual similarity23.  
 
(b) Dilution 
Trademarks with a reputation convey a message that is not only about the 
origin of the product or service: the consumer perceives them as “an emblem 
of prestige or a guarantee of quality”24. This is the brand image, the 
distinctive nature of the mark, which can be damaged even when consumers 
are not confused.  
When an undertaking decides to profit from the distinctiveness that a 
trademark has acquired by using a sign identical or similar to that trademark, 
without the consent of the trademark’s owner, he is taking unfair advantage 
of the repute of the mark. This use causes problems for the capacity of the 
trademark to distinguish its products or services for which it is registered. 
This dilution can have consequences on the behaviour of consumers.25 In 
order for the trademark’s proprietor to prevent this kind of use, the 
advantage taken must be unfair.26 In some cases, indeed, the use of a 
competitor’s trademark does not cause unfair advantage, for instance when 
the use is descriptive or made in comparative advertising.  
The Court expanded the applicability of Article 5(2) of the TDM 
recognising that dilution can occur also when the sign has been used in 
relation to similar goods or services27 even if there is no risk of confusion. 
Dilution, as defined by the General Court in Sigla v OHIM28, can 
manifest itself in different forms: “blurring” is the detriment to the 
                                                
23Case C-251/95 Sabel BV v Puma AG [1997] ECR I-06191 and Case C-342/97 
Schuhfabrik Meyer v Klijsen Handel BV [1999] ECR I-03819. 
24 Cornish (n 9). 
25 The Italian Court of First Instance of Rome has stated very clearly that: “The dilution of 
the well-known trademark annuls the effects expected from the investments made by the 
company which owns the trademark in order to consolidate its competitive position and 
acquire new market shares, with the obvious consequent prejudice to the same, and 
guarantees to the infringing company the possibility of taking advantage, in a parasitic 
manner, of the said investment, in that the infringing company is enabled  to participate in 
the economic competition without bearing the relevant costs and by virtue of its 
connection with the activity of a better known competitor, thereby taking undue 
advantage”.  Case Adidas-Salomon v Gruppo Coin [2006] ETMR 39, Tribunale di Roma. 
26Guy Tritton, Richard Davis, Michael Edenborough, James Graham, Simon Malynicz, 
Ashley Roughton, Intellectual Property in Europe (3th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2008). 
27 Case C-292/00 Davidoff and others v Gofkid Ltd [2003] ECR I-389, para 26. 
 Protection of Reputed Trademarks and Keywords 
 
 70 
distinctive character of a trademark which attempts the exclusive link 
between the product or service and the owner of that trademark. 
“Tarnishment” is the detriment to the repute of a mark, which provokes the 
association of the trademark with goods or services that have a negative 
connotation or are incompatible with the image of the mark.29 
 
(c) How far should the Protection against Dilution go? 
It is interesting to note that the wider protection granted to well-known 
trademarks has raised many discussions. The doctrine is divided. Some 
authors affirm that the protection against dilution can be excessive because it 
can lead to the creation of an exclusive right similar to exploitation rights 
granted for patents and copyrights30, while the ratio behind these forms of 
protection is different. Others argue that the protection against dilution is 
necessary in order to take into account the effort made by the trademark’s 
owner on the creation of a brand image.31  
This author shares the view that the burden of proof required by the 
CJEU, i.e. that the owner has to demonstrate the reputation, the unfair 
advantage and the detrimental effect, is a safeguard against the expansion of 
the anti-dilution protection that can become inappropriate if awarded to a 
well-known trademark each time a sign identical or similar calls it in mind.32 
 
C. TRADEMARKS AND THE INTERNET  
Today it is very difficult for the owner of a trademark with a reputation to 
monitor the use of that trademark. This is especially true if we consider the 
                                                                                                                                          
28 Case T-215/03 Sigla v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market [2007] ECR II-
00711,  paras 37-39. 
29 Tritton (n 25) 340-346. 
30 Martin Senftleben, ‘Keyword Advertising in Europe – How the Internet Challenges 
Recent Expansions of EU Trademark Protection’ (2011) 27 Connecticut Journal of 
International Law. The author presents an overview of the debate concerning the extent of 
the protection against dilution. The problem, according to the author, is that the owner of 
a trademark does not create something that furthers science or art, creation that represents 
the reason of the different protection accorded to copyright and patents, but just makes an 
investment to improve the market position of an enterprise. Furthermore while patents 
and copyright fall into public domain after a limited period of time, trademarks does not.  
31  Martin Senftleben,’The Trademark Tower of Babel - Dilution Concepts in 
International, US and EC Trademark Law’ (2009) 40 Int'l Rev. Intell. Prop. & Comp. L. 
188.  
32 ibid. 
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Internet’s features: its availability worldwide, the growing number of users 
and the volume of e-commerce. Different kinds of disputes can originate on 
the Internet from a trademark infringement, the most important and frequent 
are genuine disputes and cybersquatting.33 Domain names are also central 
for trademark owners and they give rise to a lot of disputes, as well as 
metatags and search engine keyword sales.34 We will focus our attention on 
this last category examining the jurisprudence of the CJEU in an attempt to 
delineate the parameters of reputed trademark protection for keywords. 
 
1. The Keywords Sale 
Search engines have developed systems of advertising from which they earn 
the majority of their profits.35 Keyword selling works more or less in the 
same way for all search engines, but we will take Google’s AdWords service 
as an illustrative example to understand their functioning. Anyone who 
wants to advertise his/her website can “create ads and choose keywords, 
which are words or phrases related to their business”36. When the owner of a 
website chooses some keywords, the link will appear in the page of search 
results corresponding to the keywords when the internet user types these 
                                                
33GJH.Smith, Bird&Bird, Internet Law and Regulation (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2007) 
144. Genuine disputes regard the circumstance of both parties having a legitimate claim. 
They arise when the same trademark is owned and used by different persons in respect of 
different goods or services and when the same occurs but the trademark is used in 
different countries in relation to the same goods or services. Cybersquatting is a practice 
of registering domain names before the trademarks owner in order to exact a price from 
the company for transferring the domain name to the trademark owner. 
34  ibid. Domain names are mostly discussed in relation to the modalities of their 
registration and the way to prevent it in case of abusive behaviour, metatags are words 
used in a particular section of a website, the text contained in that part is hidden from the 
normal user of the website but is visible to users of HTML or others source codes. 
Problems with metatags arise because that are visible also to search engines and  
influence the searching results. Including a competitor’s trademark in the website’s 
keywords can divert business to this website. 
35 Manavinder S.Bains, ‘The Search Engine Economy’s Achilles Heel? Addressing 
Online Parallel Imports Resulting from Keyword and Metatag Misuse’ (2006) 6 Stan 
Tech L Rev 78. The author stresses out that the introduction of the AdWords service was 
fundamental for the growth of search engines revenues. See also J. Batelle, ‘Google e gli 
altri. Come hanno trasformato la nostra cultura e riscritto le regole del business’ Milano 
2006. 
36 ‘AdWords, how it works’, available at 
<https://accounts.google.com/ServiceLogin?service=adwords&cd=GB&hl=en_GB&ltmp
l=jfk&passive=true&ifr=false&alwf=true&continue=https://adwords.google.co.uk/um/gai
aauth?apt%3DNone%26ltmpl%3Djfk&sacu=1&sarp=1&sourceid=awo&subid> accessed 
on 14 June 2013. 
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words into the search engine. These “sponsored links” appear next to the 
“natural” search results, on the upper part or on the right side of the search 
engine page. Advertisers pay a price “per click” or a “price per impression” 
for this service. As there is no limitation in the keywords’ selection and 
several advertisers can choose the same keywords, this price varies 
according to the place in the list of the sponsored links that the buyer wants.  
The purchase of keywords is the choice of the advertiser and almost 
any word can be chosen37. Normally businesses chose their own trademark 
and terms related to their business. Problems arise when they chose a trade-
marketed name that is the property of competitors. The use of a third party 
trademark as a keyword or as a part of the advertising message can lead to 
an unfair advantage taken from another trademark’s goodwill and drawing 
power38. This leads to trademark owners suing advertisers and search 
engines for infringement. Looking at their pleadings39 we find claims of 
distracting or misleading advertising, of consumer confusion, or of 
unauthorised selling of trademarks.  
While advertisers’ liability for trademark infringement did not cause 
many interpretative problems, search engine liability has generated a big 
debate. 
 
2.  The Hosting Exemption  
The Electronic Commerce Directive40 (hereinafter: ECD) contains a general 
principle of exemption from criminal and civil liability for service providers, 
Articles 12 to 15 establish three different regimes according to the nature of 
                                                
37 Ibid. Words and advertising messages must respect Google’s policy and national laws. 
Google, in the AdWords and AdSense trademark policy, includes the prohibition of 
intellectual property infringement and warns advertisers that they “are responsible for the 
keywords that they choose to generate advertisements and the text that they choose to use 
in those advertisements”. 
<http://support.google.com/adwordspolicy/bin/static.py?hl=enGB&topic=1346940&guid
e=1308252&page=guide.cs> accessed on 14 June 2013. 
38 Rick E Bruner, Leland Harden and Bob Heyman, Web marketing 2.0 (Apogeo srl 
2001). The choice of metatags and keywords became one of the most important elements 
in the strategy of brand image promotion on internet. 
39 See Rachel R. Friedman, ‘No Confusion Here: Proposing a New Paradigm for the 
Litigation of Keyword Advertising Trademark Infringment Cases’ (2010) Vanderbilt 
Journal of Entairtainement and Technology Law 355. 
40 Directive 2000/31/EC of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society 
services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market ('Directive on 
electronic commerce') OJ L 178, 1–16. 
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the relevant intermediaries. “Mere conduit” occurs when the activity of the 
service provider is limited to “the provision of access of a communication 
network” or to the “transmission of information provided by a recipient of 
the service”. The service provider benefits from the exemption if it does not 
take part in originating the transmission, if there is no active selection of the 
receiver of the transmission and if there is no selection or modification of the 
information that is transmitted. 41  When the service provider stores 
information automatically, intermediately or temporarily, his activity is 
defined as “caching”. The exemption from liability, in this case, is available 
to the service provider if his activity is neutral in processing the information 
stored or if, in case he has actual knowledge of the illicit nature of the 
information, he acts “expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the 
information it has stored”42. The last category regulated by the ECD, which 
is more interesting for this analysis of the protection of trademark with 
reputation on the internet43, is “hosting”. The activity of the service provider 
must be limited to the “storage of information provided by a recipient”. The 
exemption is available if three conditions are fulfilled: no actual knowledge 
of the illegal activity or information, no circumstances that makes this 
illegality apparent and expeditiousness in removing or disabling access to 
information when there is such knowledge or awareness44.  
To have a complete picture of this regulation and to better understand 
the findings of the CJEU relating to service providers’ liability, it is 
important to also take into account Article 15 of the ECD. This article 
contains a key principle for an Internet service provider’s liability: Member 
States cannot45 impose a general “monitoring obligation” of the stored or 
                                                
41 Directive 2000/31/CE, art 12. 
42 ibid, article 13. 
43 The CJEU founded both search engines and providers of online markets to be ‘hosting 
providers’. 
44 Directive 2000/31/CE, art 14. 
45 The Electronic Commerce Directive, however, saves the possibility for Member States 
to require hosting providers to “apply duties of care, which can reasonably be expected 
from them and which are specified by national law, in order to detect and prevent certain 
types of illegal activities”. This provision could venerate the hosting exemption because 
in many national systems, in particular in civil law countries, duties of care, when they are 
not respected, can imply contractual or extra- contractual liability. See in general Carlo 
Castronovo, La nuova responsabilità civile (3th edn, Giuffré 2006). 
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transmitted information or a general obligation “actively to seek facts or 
circumstances indicating illegal activity”46. 
 
D.  THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND KEYWORDS 
The following analysis of three recent cases by the CJEU is instructive in 
delineating the contours of the Court’s approach to the protection of 
trademarks related to keywords. 
 
1. The Google case 
The Google v Vuitton47 case was a reference for preliminary ruling from the 
French Cour de Cassation for three joined cases. In all three cases the action 
for registered trademark infringement was brought against the service 
provider and not against the advertisers and all of the actions had been 
successful before the national courts. In two of the cases the links displayed, 
connected to competitor sites, and in one case there was a connection to sites 
where counterfeit copies of the claimant’s products were offered. 
The Cour de Cassation asked the CJEU if Article 5(1) of the 
Directive 89/104/EC48 and Article 9(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation 40/9449 
should be interpreted as meaning that the proprietor of a registered 
trademark is entitled to prevent the use of keywords reproducing or imitating 
his trademark50. These keywords were used to display advertising links to 
sites offering infringed goods in one case51 and to sites “offering goods 
identical or similar to those covered by the trademark registration”52 in the 
other two cases. The second question related to the interpretation of Article 
5(2) of the Directive 89/10453 and Article 9(1)(c) of Regulation 40/9454 as 
meaning that the proprietor of a trademark with reputation might oppose that 
                                                
46 Smith (n 32) 385. The rationale of this provision is on one hand the protection of the 
fundamental freedom of expression and on the other hand the consideration of the costs in 
which internet service providers would incur if they would be forced to monitor all the 
information provided by the recipients of the services offered.  
47 Joined Cases C-236/08, C-237/08 and C-238/08, Google France SARL v Louis Vuitton 
Malletier SA [2010] ECR I-02417. 
48 Directive 89/104/CE (n 6). 
49 Regulation 40/94 (n 8). 
50 Google (n 46) para 32. 
51 ibid. 
52 ibid, para 37.  
53 Directive 89/104/CE (n 6). 
54 Regulation 40/94 (n 8). 
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use.55 The third question was about the applicability of Article 14 of 
Directive 2000/31 to the provider of the paid referencing service.56 The 
fourth question was about the liability of advertisers. The Cour de Cassation 
asked the CJEU if the request of a keyword, which reproduces or imitates a 
registered trademark to connect to a site selling goods or services is in itself, 
an infringement, given that the products or services are identical or similar to 
those designated by the trademark.57  
Firstly, the Court recalled that the owner of a registered trademark is 
entitled to prohibit the use of a sign identical to it if three conditions are 
fulfilled: firstly, the use is in the course of trade, secondly, the use is in 
relation to identical or similar goods or services to those for which the 
trademark is registered and thirdly, the functions of the trademark are or may 
be affected by that use.58  
 
(a) The Advertiser’s Liabilty 
The Court has stated that advertisers, in this case, use a keyword in the 
context of a commercial activity because it has the object of displaying a link 
to the site on which they sell their goods or services59. The first condition 
required is that the use in the course of trade is fulfilled. The second 
condition required is that the use “in relation to goods or services which are 
identical with, or similar to, those for which the trademark is registered”. 
Thus, even if the sign used for advertising purposes is not contained in the ad 
itself, the fact that the keyword selected is identical with a trademark means 
that the competitor of the trademark proprietor intends to offer an alternative 
to the goods or services of that proprietor.60 The same reasoning applies for a 
situation in which the advertiser wants to mislead internet users making 
them believe that the goods or services originate from the trademark’s owner 
or at least that there is an economic connection with such owner.61 
                                                
55 Google (n 46) para 32. 
56 ibidem paras 32- 37. 
57 Ibid, para 41. Some authors considered unusual the inclusion of this question, as no 
advertiser was party of the case, but it gave to the CJEU the occasion to rule not only on 
the liability if providers, but also of their customers, the advertisers. See Jonathan 
Cornthwaite, ‘To Key or Not to Key? The Judgment of the European Court of Justice in 
the Google France AdWords Case’ [2010] (7) EIPR 354.  
58 ibid, para 49. 
59 Google (n 46) para 52. 
60 ibid, para 69. 
61 ibid, para 72. 
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In order to verify if the use is liable to have an adverse effect on the 
functions of a trademark, the Court analyses the function of indicating origin 
and the function of advertising. It is necessary to take into account the 
specific manner in which the ad is presented62 in order to determine if the 
function of indicating origin is affected by showing to consumers an ad of a 
third party on the basis of a keyword identical with a mark. The ad must not 
suggest that there is an economic link between the trademark owner and the 
advertiser and must not be vague on the origin of the goods or services 
rendering it difficult for “a normally informed and reasonably attentive 
internet user”63 to determine if there is or is not such link. According to the 
Court: 
“(...) the proprietor of a trademark is entitled to prohibit an 
advertiser from advertising, on the basis of a keyword identical 
with that trademark which that advertiser has, without the 
consent of the proprietor, selected in connection with an 
internet referencing service, goods or services identical with 
those for which that mark is registered, in the case where that 
advertisement does not enable an average internet user, or 
enables that user only with difficulty, to ascertain whether the 
goods or services referred to therein originate from the 
proprietor of the trademark or an undertaking economically 
connected to it or, on the contrary, originate from a third 
party.”64 
 
(b) The Service Providers’ Liability 
Regarding the liability of the search-engine operators, the Court has stated 
that storing and arranging for the display of ads, keywords identical with 
registered trademarks is a commercial activity, but this does not mean that 
the service provider itself is using those signs “in the course of trade”65. The 
service provider does not use signs identical or similar to registered 
trademarks within the meaning of Article 5 of the TMD or of Article 9(1) of 
the CTM Regulation. The same reasoning applies to reputed trademarks 
within the meaning of Article 5(2) of the TDM66. Therefore, the storage of 
                                                
62 ibid, para 83. 
63 ibid, paras 89-90. 
64 ibid. 
65 Google (n 46) paras 54-57. 
66 ibid, para 105. 
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keywords identical to third parties’ trademarks is not liable for trademark 
infringement even if it occurs in the context of a commercial activity and 
without the consent of the brand owners. However, the liability of the 
referencing service provider for other kinds of torts within the meaning of 
Article 14 of Directive 2000/31 and the availability of the safe-harbour 
defence should be verified. The Grand Chamber has found that the AdWord 
service provided by Google is an “information society service” 67  and 
analysed whether its conduct was limited to that of an “intermediary service 
provider” and whether its role was “neutral”, the conditions to be fulfilled 
for the application of the exemption. Note that within the meaning of Article 
14 of the Directive 2000/31 the exemption is not available if the service 
provider was aware that the data or the activities of the recipient were 
unlawful and did not remove or disable access to the data expeditiously. 
The Court has stated that the fact that the service provider “sets the 
payment terms or provides general information to its clients”68 cannot 
deprive it of the exemption. However, the fact that it has a role in the 
“drafting of the commercial message which accompanies the advertising link 
or in the establishment or selection of keyword”69 may be relevant. It is for 
national courts to assess if the role of the service provider is “neutral” and if 
it can profit from the safe-harbour or not70. 
 
2. The L’Oreal v eBay case 
This second case71, was a reference from the High Court of England and 
Wales, in which a dispute arose between L’Oreal on the one hand, being the 
owner of UK and Community trademarks with reputation; and some 
individuals selling goods bearing its trademarks and the operator of an 
online marketplace (eBay), where the products were sold, on the other. 
                                                
67 ibid, para 110: “the legislature defined the concept of ‘information society service’ as 
covering services which are provided at a distance, by means of electronic equipment for 
the processing and storage of data, at the individual request of a recipient of services, and 
normally in return for remuneration. Regard being had to the characteristics, summarised 
in paragraph 23 of this judgment, of the referencing service at issue in the cases in the 
main proceedings, the conclusion must be that that service features all of the elements of 
that definition”. 
68 Google (n 46) para 116. 
69 ibid, para 118. 
70 ibid, para 119. 
71 Case C-324/09 L’Oreal and others v eBay International AG and others [2011] not yet 
published. 
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L’Oreal claimed that the main problem was that the products being sold by 
the other individuals were counterfeit or tester and not intended for the 
market of the European Economic Area. L’Oreal also alleged that eBay was 
jointly liable for the trademark infringement and that it was primarily liable 
when trademarks were used as keywords to display links to the website or 
when these trademarks appeared on the website as refined search terms. 
Furthermore L’Oreal claimed that it was entitled to an injunction against 
eBay, even if not liable, to prohibit further infringement. 
 
(a) The Service Providers’ Liability 
According to the CJEU eBay was acting as an advertiser72 when selecting 
keywords corresponding to a registered trademark to display sponsored 
links. As in the Google case73 this activity was deemed to be a use of a 
trademark in “the course of trade”. When eBay uses keywords to promote its 
marketplace, the use is not related to “goods or services identical with those 
for which the trademark is registered” and the trademark’s owner is not 
entitled to prohibit it. However in the case at hand the trademark was reputed 
and the Court pointed out that the analysis should be done in light of Article 
5(2) of the TDM and of Article 9(1)(c) of the CTMR, which provide for 
more extensive protection.74 
The situation is different when eBay uses keywords identical to a 
registered trademark to promote the offers of its customers. The condition of 
use “related to goods or services identical with those for which those 
trademarks are registered” is fulfilled even if the goods belong to a third 
party.75. The second condition, the affectation of one of the trademark’s 
functions, could also be fulfilled. According to the Court, eBay’s 
advertisements create an association between the trade marketed goods and 
the selling offer of these goods through the online marketplace. This link 
could have an adverse effect on trademark functions if it does not “enable 
reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant Internet users, or 
enables them only with difficulty” to ascertain the origin of the goods or 
services and whether there exists an economic link between the proprietor of 
the trademark and the undertaking, selling these goods or services76. As a 
                                                
72 L’Oreal (n 69) paras 84-85. 
73 Google (n 46) paras 51-52. 
74 L’Oreal (n 69) paras 89-90. 
75 ibid, para 91. 
76 ibid, para 94. 
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final point on use, the Court stated that the operator of an online marketplace 
is not using the trademark when a sign identical to it appears as the content 
of offers for sale. The CJEU confirmed its reasoning in Google France77 
stating that it is not the party that provides the service that uses the sign 
similar or identical to a trademark, but that the use is made by the sellers 
themselves, customers of the operator of the marketplace or of the service 
provider.78  
Turning to the hosting exemption, the findings of the Google case are 
confirmed: it is for the national court to determine if the service provider is 
an intermediary provider within the meaning of Article 14 of the Directive 
2000/31 and it is playing a passive role not having knowledge of nor control 
over the data it is processing79. It is worth noting that the Court has 
suggested that an active role can be inferred from the provision of assistance, 
especially helping customers to optimise the presentation or the promotion 
of the offers for sale80. 
The last question answered by the court concerned the possibility for 
the trademark owner to demand an injunction against the service provider 
within the meaning of Article 11 of Directive 2004/48EC. Member States 
are required to ensure that national judicial authorities can:  
“order the operator of an online market place to take measures 
which contribute not only to bringing to an end infringements 
of those rights by users of that marketplace, but also to 
preventing further infringements of that kind. Those injunctions 
must be effective, proportionate, dissuasive and must not create 
barriers to legitimate trade”.81 
 
3. Interflora v Marks & Spencer 
                                                
77 Google (n 46). 
78 L’Oreal (n 69) paras 102-103. 
79 ibid, paras 107-113. 
80 ibid, para 114. Advocate General Jaaskinen in his Opinion considers that all eBay’s 
activities in discussion should benefit of the hosting exemption: “It has been argued 
before this Court that eBay is not neutral because eBay instructs its clients in the drafting 
of the advertisements and monitors the contents of the listings. As I have explained, 
‘neutrality’ does not appear to be quite the right test under the directive for this question  I 
would find it surreal that if eBay intervenes and guides the contents of listings in its 
system with various technical means, it would by that fact be deprived of the protection of 
Article 14 regarding storage of information uploaded by the users”. 
81 L’Oreal (n 69) para 144. 
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Interflora is a company that operates a network of worldwide flower 
delivery, its trademark is registered in several Member States, it is also a 
Community trademark and it is well known in the majority of the Member 
States. Interflora brought proceedings for trademark infringement against 
Marks & Spencer when it discovered that this competitor company, offering 
a similar service, had chosen “Interflora” as a keyword and other variants of 
the trademark on the AdWords service and that by consequence, its 
advertisement appeared among the sponsored links when “Interflora” was 
taped in the search engine.82 
The High Court of England and Wales referred four questions to the 
CJEU, very similar to the questions posed in the Google and L’Oreal v eBay 
cases83. The Court confirmed that the selection of a keyword by an advertiser 
constitutes “use in the course of trade” and made it clear that this kind of use 
occurs even when the advertisement triggered by the keyword does not 
contain the sign selected.84 
 
(a) The functions of a trademark 
Marks & Spencer alleged that the protection of a trademark is granted only if 
the use of a sign identical or similar to it affects the essential function of 
origin and the Commission submitted the same conclusion affirming that the 
protection of the other trademark’s functions is reserved to trademarks with 
reputation. The Court clearly established that it is not the sole indication of 
origin function that is protected but all of the “functions” of a registered 
trademark. Article 5(1)(a) of the TMD and Article 9(1) of the CTMR85. The 
Court took the opportunity offered by this case to provide interpretative 
guidance about a trademark’s functions when a sign similar or identical to 
the trademark is used on the Internet, in particular on the Internet and 
relating to keywords, advertisement and search engines. 
The CJEU examined the function of indication of origin, the 
advertising function and the investment function, in turn, reviewing their 
jurisprudence. The function of indicating origin is affected if the “reasonably 
well-informed and reasonably observant internet users” are not able, or it is 
very difficult for them, to ascertain the origin of the product or service and if 
                                                
82 Case C-323/09 Interflora Inc. and others v Marks and Spencer plc and others [2011] not 
yet published, paras 14-20. 
83 Google (n 46) and L’Oreal (n 69). 
84 Interflora (n 80) paras 30-31. 
85 ibid, para 38. 
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there is or is not an economic link between the trademark’s owner and the 
undertaking that is advertising such product or service. Elements to be taken 
into account are the way the advertising is presented and the fact that in 
search engine cases, the trademark and the advertising containing a sign 
identical or similar to it, are displayed in the same page.86 
The advertising function is affected when the owner of a trademark is 
impeded to use its mark to “inform and win over consumers” 87. The use of 
keywords in search engines and advertising services related to them does not 
have that adverse effect but it proposes an alternative to the products or 
services that bear the trademark.88 
The investment function is affected when a third party makes use of a 
sign identical to the trademark that has the effect of producing an 
interference with “the proprietor’s use of its trademark to acquire or preserve 
a reputation capable of attracting consumers and retaining their loyalty”89. 
The same occurs for trademarks, which already have a reputation if that use 
can “jeopardize its maintenance”90. 
With regard to the specific subject matter of trademarks with 
reputation, the Court analysed the possibilities of dilution and freeriding. 
The distinctive character of a trademark with reputation can be diluted if the 
use by a third party of a sign identical or similar to it “contributes to turning 
the trademark into a generic term”91; according to the CJEU this is not 
always the case when a sign identical or similar to a trademark with 
reputation is selected from third parties as a keyword. This can occur but it is 
for the national judge to determine if the impact on the market of this kind of 
selection of keywords is strong enough to determine the perception of the 
trademark as a generic term.92 
The most interesting point of this case is the finding arrived at by the 
Court in relation to the unfair advantage taken of the distinctive character. 
Reiterating the position taken in Google and L’Oreal v eBay, the CJEU held 
that the selection by third parties of a sign identical or similar to a trademark 
with reputation as a keyword can, if there is no due cause:  
                                                
86 Interflora (n 80) paras 44-50. 
87 ibid, paras 54-59. 
88 ibid. 
89 ibid, para 62. 
90 ibid, para 63. 
91 Interflora (n 80) para 79. 
92 ibid, para 83. 
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“(…) be construed as a use whereby the advertiser rides on the 
coat-tails of a trademark with a reputation in order to benefit 
from its power of attraction, its reputation and its prestige, and 
to exploit, without paying any financial compensation and 
without being required to make efforts of its own in that regard, 
the marketing effort expended by the proprietor of that mark in 
order to create and maintain the image of that mark. If that is 
the case, the advantage thus obtained by the third party must be 
considered to be unfair.”93 
The Court clarified that this would be more common if the advertiser offers 
for sale, products, which are an imitation of the goods bearing the original 
trademark. When the advertisement message consists in the proposal of an 
alternative to the products or services of the proprietor of the trademark, the 
use of a sign identical or similar to a trademark with reputation takes place in 
the ambit of fair competition. The national judge shall verify that these uses 
do not cause dilution or tarnishment or do not affect one of the functions of 
trademarks.94 
 
4. The Reasoning of US Courts 
The facts in Rescuecom v Google95 were very similar to those in Interflora v 
Marks and Spencer. Some competitors bought keywords corresponding to 
the Rescuecom`s trademark on the AdWords service. The claimant alleged 
that internet users were deceived and diverted by this use of the trademark 
by a third party and sued Google, the service provider, for damages to the 
reputation of the trademark that is widely known in the USA. The United 
States Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit (hereinafter: the US Court) 
held that Google did not infringe Rescuecom’s trademark because the use of 
the trademark made by the Adword service was not a use in commerce96. In 
                                                
93 ibid, para 89. 
94Interflora (n 80) paras 90-92. 
95 Case Rescuecom Corp. V Google Inc. United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, 562 F.3d 123, 2009. 
96 Lemley, Menell, Merges, Samuelson, Carver, Software and Internet Law (4th edn, 
Walters Kluwer Law & Business 2011). The use of the trademark in commerce is 
essential for an action under the Latham Act, according to the Court Google`s use of 
Rescuecom`s trademark was an internal use. This decision provoked a great debate about 
the notion of the use in commerce even because Google alleged that his use of trademarks 
in the AdWord service is comparable with the product placement that retail vendors use 
to benefit from a competitor`s name recognition which is not prohibited by the Latham 
Act. 
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it’s reasoning, the Court pointed out that the circumstance that the trademark 
does not appear in the advertisements connected with the keyword excludes 
the use in commerce. This solution comes to the same result as the findings 
of the CJEU but in a different way, it appears that the District Court left the 
possibility to find a use in commerce when a trademark is exhibited in the 
content of the advertisement. On the contrary, the CJEU has excluded that 
the service provider makes a use in course of trade both when selling 
keywords and when triggering advertisements, which contain the 
trademark97. 
Regarding the liability of the advertisers, the findings of the District 
Court of Massachusetts are similar to the position taken by the CJEU. In the 
Hearts on Fire Company v Blue Nile98 case, the selection of a third party’s 
trademark as a keyword made by an advertiser was found to be a use in 
commerce. The owner of the trademark has to demonstrate that this use can 
lead to consumer confusion.99 
One of the most discussed problems is the hosting providers’ liability, 
the jurisprudence of US District Courts is sometimes incoherent and a part of 
the doctrine stressed the need of clarification100. The majority of US District 
Courts are adopting the approach taken in Tiffany v eBay101. According to 
this case, operators like eBay are not liable for trademark infringement only 
because they have a general knowledge that an infringement can occur on 
their site. It is the trademark owner and not the service provider that should 
police uses by third parties of their trademark online102. This is an interesting 
point that has not been considered by the CJEU. 
 
E. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
                                                
97 Loreal (n 69). 
98 Case Hearts on Fire Company, LLC v Blue Nile, Inc United States District Court for 
the District of Massachussets, 603 F. 2d 274, 2009. 
99 Lemley (n 93) the notion of consumers utilised by the USA Court is  ‘reasonably 
prudent purchasers exercising ordinary care’, this is not very different from the notion of 
enable reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant internet users adopted y the 
ECJ. The USA Court furthermore specifies that the confusion must occour to an 
appreciable number of consumers. 
100 T. E. Lerner, ‘Playing the Blame Game, Online: Who is Liable When Counterfeit 
Goods are Sold Through Online Auction Houses?’ (2010) 22 Pace Int LR 241. 
101 Case Tiffany (NJ), Inc v eBay, Inc, 576 F Supp. 2d 463. 
102 Lerner (n97) the duty of policing a mark online can be an element to draw the lines of 
service providers liability. 
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The response in academic literature to the positions taken by the CJEU in the 
three cases analysed above has been widely varied. However, one common 
thread is the need for further clarification.103 The authors that criticised the 
Court’s broadening of trademark protection saw these cases as the 
opportunity to come “back to basis”104. However, that opportunity was not 
taken and the protection of all trademark functions was reaffirmed. 
Moreover, the Court has made it clear that this protection is not reserved for 
trademarks with reputation105. 
What appears to be particularly problematic is the application of the 
hosting exemption. The decisions on service providers’ liability taken by 
national courts before these three cases lay in stark contrast.106 If on the one 
hand the Court has provided a clear definition of the concept of “information 
society service provider” and has described the requirement of “neutrality” 
for services to benefit of the limitation of liability, on the other hand national 
judges will decide if the above-mentioned condition is fulfilled107. National 
judges can take into account a number of elements. One example mentioned 
in this article is the existence of a “duty of care”, if provided by national 
legislation. Furthermore, given the differences of the application of civil 
liability in the judicial systems of the Member States, the probability that the 
solutions will continue to diverge is high. 
The CJEU appears to be struggling to find the appropriate balance 
between granting protection to trademarks and preserving the freedom of 
expression and the freedom of competition. The principles opined by the 
Courts in Google v Louis Vuitton, L’Oreal v eBay and Interflora v Marks & 
Spencer provide a lucid and complete portrait of the conditions for the owner 
of a trademark or of a trademark with reputation to prevent the use in the 
                                                
103 Patrick Van Eecke and Maarten Truyens, ‘Recent Events in EU Internet Law’ (2011) 
11 Journal of Internet Law 3; Christopher Morcom, ‘Trade marks and the Internet: where 
are we now?’(2012) 34(1) European Intellectual Property Review 40; Georgios 
Psaroudakis, ‘In search of the trade mark functions: keyword advertising in European 
law’ (2012) 34(1) European Intellectual Property Review 33. 
104 Senftleben (n 29). 
105 Interflora (n 80) para 38. 
106 T. Bednarz, C. Waelde, ‘Search Engines, Keyword Advertising and Trade Marks: Fair 
Innovation or Free Riding?’ in Law and the Internet (3th edn ed L. Edwards and C. 
Waelde, Hart Publishing 2009). The authors ask if keyword advertising should be 
regarded as fair innovation or whether that section of the marketplace should be subject to 
the control of the trademark owner. 
107  Francesco Rizzuto, ‘The liability of online intermediary service providers for 
infringements of intellectual property rights’ (2012) 18(1) Computer and 
Telecommunications Law Review 11. 
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course of trade of a sign identical or similar to the trademark. Advertisers 
have the requisite elements needed to understand when the use of keywords 
corresponding to a trademark takes unfair advantage of the goodwill of the 
trademark or when it is detrimental to its reputation.108 Internet service 
providers can infer from the findings of the CJEU at least an idea of the 
extension of the exoneration from liability. 
It is submitted that these main actors should be accorded the liberty to 
draw conclusions and reorganize their strategies in order to be able to 
maintain their position in a market that is in a constant state of flux. 
Taking Google as an example, it is submitted that there are two 
potential solutions that would limit the cost of litigation and would allow 
search engines, such as Google, that provide an advertising service (like 
AdWord) to reduce the actions for trademark infringement brought against 
them and trademark owners (i.e. brands with a well established reputation) 
to monitor the use of their trademark as a keyword. One possible option for 
Google in order to prevent liability for trademark infringement would be to 
ask for the relevant documentation when advertisers select keywords that are 
highly risky in consideration of their reputation. This solution is currently 
used by Facebook. It would be very convenient for trademark owners but 
maybe not for Google. However, this solution would be contrary to Google’s 
policy to be as passive a service provider as possible. Furthermore, this 
would reduce its profits from the AdWord service. 
Another solution, less expensive for Google in terms of human 
resources, and quite satisfactory for the proprietors of trademarks may be 
suggested as follows: Google would set up a register of reputed trademarks 
that will make a connection between keywords identical or similar to 
trademarks and the owner of the respective trademark. The purpose of this 
connection would be to put in evidence each purchase of that kind of 
keyword sending a notice to the owner of the trademark. The subscription to 
the register would be voluntary, accompanied by documents attesting to the 
                                                
108 A Anderl, ‘The Impact of European Supreme Court Decisions on Internet Advertising 
Practices’, IP Client Strategies in Europe (Aspatore 2010). After Google v Vuitton and 
L’Oreal v eBay ‘every specific marketing campaign should be reviewed before its 
introduction to the public. The scope of such review should preliminary be the danger of 
the advertisement being deemed misleading for consumers. Common mistakes in practice 
are, for example, to deliberately use direct competitors' product names for advertisement 
campaigns’. 
 Protection of Reputed Trademarks and Keywords 
 
 86 
identity of the trademark owner that will pay a price for each country in 
which they seek to subscribe. 
A practical example: Louis Vuitton Italy subscribes to that register 
and asks to connect to its trademark the keywords ‘Louis Vuitton’, 
‘louisvuitton’, ‘LV’. Each time that there is a selection of these keywords in 
the AdWord service, a notice will be sent to the address stipulated by the 
owner of the trademark at the moment of subscription. This system would 
allow Google to continue to sell keywords without exerting control and 
would allow the trademark owner to monitor the use of those keywords and 
react promptly if there is an infringing use in the course of trade.109 
                                                
109 These proposals have been conceptualised in collaboration with the consulting service 
of Riccardo Visione, computer engineering student, riccardovisione@gmail.com. 
